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Abstract

Bluetooth technology has potential for widespread use within the Department of
Defense and the Air Force. An office environment using Bluetooth technology can
wirelessly connect computers, printers, and other office equipment in order to share
information over short distances. The clutter and annoyance of cables connecting
equipment can be eliminated. Bluetooth provides a standard interface for connection, as
opposed to many different proprietary cables.
The research is conducted indoors in a climate controlled environment, with
minimal obstructions, to closely follow free-space signal propagation. Four different
antenna orientations are used. The factors varied are the distance between devices, and
the antenna orientation.
This research determined that two of the four cards tested have a specific distance
where a change from Data High rate packets and Data Medium rate are used. The change
occurs at two meters for one and three meters for the other. This research also shows that
manufacturers transmit identical data in identical formats. Also, this research shows that
antenna orientation, and receiver signal strength indicator values have no predictive value
in determining packet type used for transmission.

xii

PACKET ANALYSIS OF UNMODIFIED BLUETOOTH
COMMUNICATION DEVICES

1. Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Bluetooth technology has potential for widespread use within the Department of
Defense and the Air Force. An office environment using Bluetooth technology can
wirelessly connect computers, printers and other office equipment in order to share
information over short distances. The clutter and annoyance of cables connecting
equipment can be eliminated. Bluetooth provides a standard interface for connection, as
opposed to many different proprietary cables.
As with any new technology, especially wireless technology, there is a potential
for misuse and possible security implications. Bluetooth provides support for encryption
and frequency hopping to increase its security. One aspect of Bluetooth technology that
has not been explored is how much information can be determined about a user, their
data, or equipment just by examining the packet type.
1.2 Background
Wireless technology has a great potential for widespread use in the DoD.
However, all wireless transmissions are vulnerable to interception and recording. Since
capturing and recording wireless traffic is not very difficult, how much information could
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a potential attack gain by analyzing Bluetooth traffic? Data analysis on packet traffic
might expose some security risk that has not been discovered yet.
1.3 Research Focus
The focus of this research is to determine what kind of information can be
determined using packet analysis. The two aspects being researched are the ability to
determine the distance between users based on the type of packets being transmitted, and
whether a specific manufacturer of Bluetooth cards can be identified by packet analysis.
The ability to identify a specific manufacturer of Bluetooth devices might allow a
potential attacker to exploit a possible weakness in that device. The ability to determine
the distance between users could link a Bluetooth identity to a person’s real identity. A
Bluetooth user would not be able to remain anonymous.
Special hardware or software for the Bluetooth cards is not used. All cards used
in this investigation are unmodified, commercially available, off-the-shelf devices. The
use of unmodified devices helps determine how much information can be gained and
exploited by someone with the ability to electronically sniff packets. Recording packets
on a Bluetooth transmission is not a difficult task. It is possible and common for anyone
to have the ability to capture and record a Bluetooth link.
1.3.1 Objectives
This research has two main objectives. The first objective is to determine if there
are any differences in the way various manufacturers of Bluetooth devices transmit the
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same data. If there are any variations, are they significant enough to determine a specific
manufacturer?
The second objective is to determine if the distance between users can be
determined based on the type of packets being transmitted between the pair. If the
distance between users can be determined, then more research into the direction of the
users can be done in the future. This research does not take direction into account, only
distance.
1.3.2 Approach
This research follows a particular process to accomplish the above objectives.
First, currently published research associated with Bluetooth technology is reviewed.
Also covered is the Bluetooth core specification. An overview of the available Bluetooth
sniffing applications is covered. Bluetooth Receiver Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI)
values are recorded for various distances and antenna orientations. The RSSI metric is
collected because it is the only signal power function provided in the Bluetooth
specification. This data is analyzed to determine any statistical significance. The final
step in data collection transfers a file between two laptops at various distances and
antenna orientation to record the packet transmissions. This information is analyzed.
1.4 Summary
The primary focus of this research is to determine any differences in manufacturer
implementations of the Bluetooth specification, and to determine if the distance between
Bluetooth devices can be determined based on the type of packets being transmitted.

3

This research is restricted to commercially available hardware in a specific environment.
It provides a foundation for further research.
The rest of the document is presented as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview
of Bluetooth research, literature and specification. This chapter also addresses some of
the known security issues with Bluetooth technology. Chapter 3 describes the
methodology for accomplishing the objectives of this research. Chapter 4 discusses the
experiments conducted, the data collection and the data analysis. Chapter 5 contains a
summary of the research, and presents the conclusions of this research.
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2. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides background information used as the basis for the research.
Areas covered include an overview of wireless computing, the Bluetooth protocol,
Bluetooth security and Bluetooth performance.
2.2 Overview of wireless computing in general
Wireless computing can be a great benefit to the computer user. Using one
universal protocol to connect together a wide range of peripherals can make for a very
clean workspace. The military applications of this technology are easy to see. Short
range applications of wireless mice, keyboards and speakers make for a cleaner
workspace. Medium range wireless networks for the office environment can eliminate
the need to run new networking cable in an old building. The Army is even using long
range wireless networks to enable soldiers to travel freely in the battlefield, yet still be in
constant contact.
2.3 Overview of Bluetooth
The Bluetooth idea was launched by Ericsson in 1994 [Blu01]. The original
intention was to make a wireless connection between an earphone or cordless headset and
the wireless phone. Ericsson determined that a low power radio frequency technology
was a feasible approach. In early 1998, Ericsson, IBM, Intel, Nokia, and Toshiba
formed the Bluetooth Special Interests Group (SIG) [Blu01]. The purpose of the
Bluetooth SIG is to “develop, publish and promote the preferred short-range wireless
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specification for connecting mobile products, and to administer a qualification program
that fosters interoperability for a positive user experience” [Blu01]. The SIG’s goal is to
have open licensed, free specifications and protocols, and to encourage other companies
to join the SIG. Free access to the specification and protocols allows products to be
interoperable and grow the Bluetooth market share. As of three years ago, there were
over 2000 members in the SIG [Blu01].
In May 1998, the Bluetooth SIG officially announced the Bluetooth technology.
A little over a year later in July 1999, the Bluetooth version 1.0 specification was
released. This specification was updated to version 1.1 in February 2001. The most
current version (1.2) was adopted November 2003. Version 1.2 implements Advanced
Frequency Hopping, enhances voice processing, faster connection setup and is backward
compatible with pervious versions. Version 2.0 is currently under development, but there
is no date when it is scheduled to be released. [Blu01]
The name for Bluetooth was chosen by Ericsson, named after the king of
Denmark, Harald Blåtand. Blåtand translates literally into “Blue Tooth” (king of
Denmark from 940-981 [DeS03]. Blue Tooth did not have blue teeth, but had dark hair
and a dark complexion. He earned his place in history by unifying Denmark under
Christianity and conquering Norway and uniting the two nations. Following this uniting
theme, the Bluetooth name was chosen to signify uniting the world of telecom and
computers.
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2.3.1 Technology Description
Bluetooth wireless technology is a short range wireless protocol designed as a
cable replacement technology for desktop computers. It has since been expanded to
include many more applications including keyboards, mice, phones, PDA’s, digital
cameras, and other portable electronic devices. Traditionally, these devices have used a
proprietary cable that makes interconnection difficult which leads to a cluttered work
space. If a user loses or breaks a cable, a replacement may be hard to find.
Bluetooth operates in the 2.402 to 2.480 GHz ISM (industrial, scientific, and
medical) band and uses a fast frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) technique.
FHSS enables multiple access to the channel, reduces the amount of interference, and
allows synchronized Bluetooth receivers to access the data. Bluetooth uses 79 different
channels, 1 MHz per channel, and changes frequency 1600 times per second [Blu01]. If
there is interference on one frequency only that transmission is lost. A limited number of
errors caused by interference can be corrected by an Error Correction Code (ECC).
2.3.2 Description of the Bluetooth Protocol Stack
The Bluetooth protocol stack is shown in Figure 1. The goal of the protocol stack
is to make it possible for different applications to communicate through a common
interface. The common parts of the stack all applications use is the Bluetooth data link
and physical layer. Some will use a vertical slice of the protocol stack. The Bluetooth
protocol was designed so that it does not change any of the higher level protocols such as
TCP/UDP and OBEX. Since the Bluetooth specification is an open specification, any
vendor can incorporate proprietary protocols into the generic Bluetooth stack.
7
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Figure 1 The Bluetooth Protocol Stack [Ana01]

The Bluetooth protocol has four major areas: the Bluetooth core protocol, cable
replacement protocol, telephony control protocols, and adopted protocols. A simpler
division is has only two layers the transport layers and the middleware layers [Bis01].
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2.3.2.1 Bluetooth Transport Layers
The following briefly describes the Transport layers radio, baseband, link manager (LM),
host controller interface (HCI) and the logical link control and adaptation protocol
(L2CAP) [Bis01].
2.3.2.1.1 Radio Layer
The Bluetooth radio specifications describe the physical characteristics of the
Bluetooth signal. The physical characteristics are important because this research focuses
on the low level details of the Bluetooth signal.
2.3.2.1.2 Baseband Layer
The baseband layer defines how piconets are created and the physical RF
transmission link. Two parameters are required for Bluetooth devices to talk to each
other. One is the 48-bit devices address determined at the manufacture time
(BD_ADDR). The second piece of information is the free running 28-bit clock. The
clock advances once every 312.5 µseconds, corresponding to half the dwell time at a hop
rate of 1,600 hops/sec [Bis01]. These two parameters form the basis for the protocol
authentication and authorization functions.
2.3.2.2.1 Formation of Piconet and Scatternet
A piconet is a Bluetooth term for the network formed by two to eight Bluetooth
nodes. A piconet is a short-range ad hoc network containing wireless links. Piconets
have master/slave topology; each piconet can have only one master but up to seven active
slaves. Each slave is given a temporary unique identifier called an active member
9

address (AM_ADDR). Other slaves can be synchronized with the master, but must be in
the parked mode only (non-active).
Overlapping piconets form a scatternet. Scatternets extend the range of a device
and allow it to communicate with multiple devices. A master in one piconet can be a
slave in another piconet.
The hopping sequence is coordinated with the master device in the piconet. The
time slot for a hop is 625 microseconds. Each baseband transmission lasts only one slot,
but some packets can occupy three or five time slots. In the multi-slot packet, the
frequency is not changed for those time slots. The hopping sequence resumes where it
would have been if the device had used a single time slot.
There are two main types of transmission packets; asynchronous connectionless
link (ACL), and synchronous connection-oriented links (SCO). The SCO link is used
mainly for audio transmissions, and has a 64 kbps bi-directional data rate. The SCO link
does not support retransmission if an error occurs but attempts to recover from the error
using a forward error correction mechanism. “The ACL link is a best effort link
appropriate for asynchronous data transmission” [Bis01]. The ACL does support
retransmission, sequence number, and forward error correction.
2.3.2.1.3 Link Manager Protocol
The Link Manager Protocol (LMP) is used to set up the properties of the
Bluetooth link between devices. The LMP coordinates all authorization, authentication,
and encryption messages. LMP messages are also used to determine what kind of link is
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established between devices (ACL or SCO) and the power modes of the devices. For
SCO connections, the poll interval and the packet size are handled with LMP messages.
2.3.2.1.4 Host Controller Interface Protocol
The host controller interface in not a protocol. Its role is to act as a standard
interface to the lower layers of the Bluetooth stack. “A host may instruct its baseband to
create a link to a specific Bluetooth device, execute inquiries, request authentication, pass
a link key to the baseband, request activating a low power mode etc”[Bis01].
2.3.2.1.5 Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol
The logical link control and adaptation protocol (L2CAP) “supports higher level
protocol multiplexing, packet segmentation and reassembly, and the conveying of quality
of service information.” [Blu01] The L2CAP “hides” the specifics of the lower layers
and provides a packet interface to the higher layers.
At this level of the protocol the master/slave concept no longer exists. The
L2CAP multiplexes channels over the devices’ ACL links. Each slave has only one ACL
link, while the master has an ACL link for each slave. Packets are no longer limited to a
one transmission time slot, they can be much larger. The segmentation and reassembly
for transmission over the air are handled by the L2CAP.
2.3.2.2 The Middleware Protocols
The middleware protocols are the radio frequency communication (RFCOMM),
service discovery protocol (SDP), and the telephony control signaling protocol (TCS).
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These protocols are used as a link to bridge the Bluetooth protocols and make them
compatible with existing protocols, like TCP/IP. Not all of the middleware protocols are
used in a communication application. Each session may use different parts of the
middleware protocols. The two middleware protocols most applicable to this research
are discussed below.
2.3.2.2.1 Service Discovery Protocol
The Service Discovery Protocol (SDP) supports a wide range of Bluetooth
equipped devices. When a Bluetooth device needs to service query another Bluetooth
device the SDP is used. The SDP provides information about the services, but does not
provide access to them. Access to the services is accomplished through different means
once the device learns about them.
2.3.2.2.2 Radio Frequency Communication Protocol
The Radio Frequency Communication (RFCOMM) protocol is “used as to expose
a serial interface to the packet-based Bluetooth protocol layers” [Bis01]. The RFCOMM
emulates the signals of an RS-232 cable. It is based on the ETSI standard TS0 7.10
[Blu01]. The RFCOMM is useful because it permits legacy serial applications to be
compatible with the Bluetooth link without any modification. The RFCOMM can
“support up to 60 simultaneous connections between two Bluetooth devices [Blu01].”
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2.4 Known Security Vulnerabilities of Bluetooth wireless technology
Bluetooth wireless technology is primarily designed as a cable replacement
technology, not as an alternative to medium range wireless protocols such as IEEE
802.11. With short range, limited power output, and a constantly changing network, the
security issues facing the designers are different from those encountered by an IEEE
802.11 wireless network. One of the bigger obstacles for a Bluetooth network is
determining what devices are allowed to communicate with each other and how to
prevent other devices from listening in. Establishing an ad hoc network is done with a
combination of authentication and encryption, but both have their weakness. The
Bluetooth protocol has specific weaknesses including eavesdropping and impersonation
attack, location and identity attack, and a weakness in the encryption algorithm used. All
of these are explained below.
2.4.1 Eavesdropping and Impersonation
In an eavesdropping attack, an attacker intercepts traffic between other Bluetooth
nodes. In an impersonation attack, the attacking Bluetooth device hijacks another
device’s identity and pretends to be that device; a traditional man-in-the-middle type of
attack. Man-in-the-middle attacks are not unique to Bluetooth but are a vulnerability
common to many protocols.
There are two approaches to carrying out these types of attacks. The first
approach is to determine the key being used. The second is to steal the initialization keys
by actively participating in the authentication process. In the first type, the attacking
device is in a receive-only mode; it does not transmit anything to the device it is
13

attacking. The attacking device generates all the keys up to a certain length. It then
performs the “verification step in the initialization key protocol based on his guess, and
the random strings communicated in the clear”[JaW01]. If the guess is correct, the
results will be correct. Now the attacker can listen undetected on the other device’s
traffic.
2.4.2 Location and Identity Attack
In a location and identity attack, the goal is to associate a person’s identity with
the Bluetooth identity. Linking a Bluetooth identity to a person’s identity can be used to
track movements and habits. Identity matching attacks are easy to carry out as long as
the victim’s device is in the discovery mode. When a Bluetooth device is in discovery
mode, it responds to discovery inquiries. The attacker presents his Bluetooth device to
connect to the victim’s device, which responds with its Bluetooth identity. An identity
for a Bluetooth device is unique, thus it is easy to track.
Even a device is not in discovery mode, it can still be tracked. Tracking is done
using the channel access code (CAC). The CAC is computed using the unique Bluetooth
device identifier of the master device. Bits 39-62 of the CAC are bits 1-24 of the
Bluetooth device address. Each message transmitted contains the CAC. Therefore, it is a
pretty simple matter to determine the Bluetooth device address and keep track of them.
This attack is made more difficult because the attacking device must be modified to
extract the CAC from the messages being transmitted. In a normal Bluetooth device, the
CAC is not reported to the application layer, and is hidden from the user.
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2.4.3 Weakness of the Encryption Cipher
Bluetooth has the ability to encrypt the data being sent. “The Bluetooth
specification 1.0 describes the link encryption algorithm as a stream cipher using 4 LFSR
(linear feedback shift registers)”[Tra01] with a key length of between 8 and 128 bits.
Note that none of the transmissions dealing with authentication and authorization are
encrypted. A brute force attack takes at most 2128 operations to break the encryption.
Jakobsson and Wetzel have shown that it can be broken with 2100 operations [JaW01].
Golic has shown that the cipher can be broken with a time and space complexity of 266
[Gol97].
To carry out the attack an attacker guesses the first 93 bits of the cipher.
Bluetooth uses four linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) for data encryption. The four
LFSR total 128 bits, but are each sized differently. The LFSRs are 25 bits for the first, 31
bits for the second, 33 bits for the third and 39 bits for the fourth. The 93 bit size is
chosen because that represents the size of the first three LFSRs. The last 39 bits, or the
fourth LFSR, are computed based on the previous 93 bits and the contents of the
summation register. The attacker can verify if the guess is correct by “comparing a string
of the actual output to the generated output”[JaW01]. At least 128 bits of ciphertext and
known plaintext are needed to verify the guess. The verification operations take on the
order of 27 operations. This yields a total complexity of 2100 operations. Note that is
attack must be carried out twice to be successful. The first time the attack is successful, it
will yield the key used for one frame. It must be carried out a second time to get the
master key.
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The second attack described by Golic [Gol97] is even more efficient, because
most of the work is done ahead of time. In this attack, the attacker chooses at random N
states of the cipher, and computes the output key steam. This information is stored in a
database for later use. Then the attacker observes M bits of the keystream. “If M*N >
2132 on expects to see a collision between the actual keystream and a keystream in the
database” [JaW01]. By choosing N=M=266 , the cipher can be broken in time and space
complexity of 266 .
2.5 Key Transmissions in the Clear
The first four of the five steps in the initialization process, as described in Section
2.6, are transmitted unencrypted. The initialization key is not a security concern because
it is discarded. The link key is transmitted in the clear too. The link key is important to
protect, since it is used in the generation of the encryption key.

2.6 Key Exchange
The Bluetooth specification defines the steps for key generation and management.
There are a several kinds of keys used in Bluetooth, but the most important is the link
key. This key is used for authentication between Bluetooth devices and is also used in
the encryption process. In addition to the link key, there is an initialization key and an
encryption key. All three keys are used in a five step process to establish secure
Bluetooth communications. The five steps, as defined in the Bluetooth specification
[Blu01] are:
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1. Generation of initialization key
2. Generation of link key
3. Link key exchange
4. Authentication
5. Generation of the encryption key (optional)
The E22 algorithm [Blu01] derives the 128 bit initialization key, which is used to
create the link key. The link key is created from a Bluetooth device address
(BD_ADDR), a PIN, the length of the PIN, and a random number (IN_RAND). After the
link keys are exchanged, the initialization key is discarded.
Authentication is based on a challenge-response scheme where the key is checked
by using a 2-move protocol using symmetric secret keys. The authentication procedure
can be done with either stored link keys or by pairing devices and entering a personal
identification number (PIN). The link manager coordinates the actions between the two
devices. The link key procedure is depicted in Figure 2.
The challenger sends the responder a random number, the device’s address of the
responding node and the link key. This is submitted to the E1 algorithm which calculates
a signed response (SRES) value [Can01]. The responder sends the SRES value back to
the challenger. If the two values are the same, authentication has been successful. If
mutual authentication is required, then the responder and challenger change roles, which
is coordinated through the Link Manager.

17

Figure 2 Challenge-Response for Bluetooth [Tra00]

If authentication fails, the SRES values do not match, and a random amount of
time elapses until a new authentication attempt is made. The length of time between
attempts is exponentially increases for each repeated failure to authenticate. This
prevents an attacker from trying a large number of keys over a short period of time.
The encryption step is optional, however, if used, the key is between 8 and 128
its. The encryption key is composed of a 128-bit current link key, a 128-bit random
number (EN_RAND), and a 96-bit ciphering offset number (COF). It is created using the
8-round SAFER+ encryption algorithm [Blu01]. The 96-bit COF is derived from either
the master Bluetooth device address or the ACO value calculated from the authentication
procedure.
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2.7 Bluetooth Packet Format
The Bluetooth specification [Blu01] gives a general description of a Bluetooth
packet. The packet is in little endian format, with the least significant bit sent over the air
first. A typical packet consists of three main parts; the access header, the header and the
payload. The access header is a fixed size of 72 bytes, the header is a fixed size of 54
bytes, and the payload can range from 0 to 2745 bytes. This is the general format for all
Bluetooth packets. The payload portion varies according to the specific packet type the
transmission is being used for. The specific packet types are frequency hop
synchronization (FHS) packets for synchronization, HV packets for voice transmission,
DV packets for a combination voice and data packet, and DM or DH packet types for
asynchronous connections-less data transfer. The RS-232, RFCOMM, and Telephony
Control Protocol (TCS) packet are all formatted different, but are not used in this
research which focuses on baseband DM and DH packet types.
The DHx(x:1,2,3) use only a 16 bit CRC at the end of the payload to verify for data
integrity. The DMx(x:1,2,3) use a 2/3 FEC coding that can correct 1 bit error out of 15
[JuP02]. The DMx packets are more likely to be used in a lower quality Bluetooth
channel because it can correct errors without retransmission. The DHx packets are more
likely to be used when the probability of transmission error is very low.
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Table 1 Describing ACL Packet Types [Jup02]

The access header packet is used for synchronization, DC offset compensation,
and identification. The first 4-bits are the preamble, the next 64-bits are the sync word,
and there is an option 4-bit trailer at the end. The extra 4-bits are used only if a packet
header follows the access header packet.
The packet header consists of six fields:
•

AM_ADDR

3-bit active member address

•

TYPE

4-bit type code

•

FLOW

1-bit flow control

•

ARQN

1-bit acknowledge indication

•

SEQN

1-bit sequence number

•

HEC

8-bit header error check

The total header length is 54-bits, consisting of these 18-bits repeated three times
for error correction purposes.
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The Bluetooth specification lists five common packet types; ID, POLL, NULL,
FHS, and DM. The ID packet is 68-bits and is used in paging, inquiry and response
routines. The POLL packet is 126-bits and is used by the master in a piconet to poll the
slaves. A POLL packet forces the slaves to respond, even if the slave has no information
to send. The NULL packet is 126-bits and carries no payload. It is used to respond to
ARQN and FLOW packets. The frequency hop synchronization (FHS) packet is 240bits, with a 144 information bits. It is a special control packet revealing the Bluetooth
device address and the clock of the sender, among other things. The DM1 packet is used
to support control messages or it can be used to carry regular user data.
2.7.1 Data Whitening
The Bluetooth specification describes how a simple form of bit scrambling is
performed on packets before they are transmitted. Data whitening is randomizes
redundant patterns. Whitening is not a form of encryption, but rather a very simple way
to randomize the packet data. It is accomplished using a linear feedback shift register,
the master clock and the packet. Both the packet header and the payload are scrambled.

2.8 Previous Related Work
Previous work related to Bluetooth has been done at AFIT by Captain Tim
Kneeland and Lt Randal Noel [Kne03, Noe03]. Captain Kneeland’s thesis investigated
transmission range and data throughput for Bluetooth devices; Lt. Noel’s thesis was on
performance of Bluetooth while operating in 802.11 interference environment.
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Captain Kneeland’s thesis [Kne03] has some important implications for this
research. His thesis found that is was possible to get reliable transmission up to 30
meters under ideal conditions while using Bluetooth devices designed for 10 meters. The
main factor in determining range of transmission is the orientation of the antenna relative
to each other. Antenna orientation impacts the signal quality and therefore the
transmission range. The antenna orientation is a parameter that will be addressed.
Lt Noel’s thesis [Noe03] found that Bluetooth throughput was unaffected while
operating in an interference environment with IEEE 802.11 and provided good
background information on how Bluetooth operates.
2.8.1 Channel Quality and Packet Type
There is a relationship between channel quality and the packet type for a
Bluetooth network [JuP02]. “The selection of packet types can be determined using the
original frequency hop sequence and the RF channel quality indicated in the frequency
table, which is controlled by the link manager (LM) and the link controller (LC) of
Bluetooth units.” [JuP02]. The manufacturer of the Bluetooth card can determine the
quality of the Bluetooth signal and the corresponding packet type to use. It is highly
unlikely that the user will be able to control what kind of packets will be used for
transmission.
Figure 4 shows the various levels of tolerance to error that the different packet
types have. As expected, it shows that the DM1 packet is the most error tolerant, while
the DH5 packet is the least error tolerant. Signal quality is the main factor in determining
what type of packet is used for transmission.
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2.8.2

Packet Types and Throughput

Previous work [Val02] has examined the relationship between packet type and
throughput. This research is done with the six Asynchronous Connection Link packets
that are used for data transfer. The six packets types are DM1, DH1, DM3, DH3, DM5
and DH5. Tests were conducted in high signal to noise ratio channels and low signal to
noise ratio channels. The most important conclusion is that “the DH1 and DH3 packets
never achieve maximum throughput” [Val02]. The research suggests that these packets
should only be used if latency or data-length requirements require their use. It was also
found that the “DM 1 frames are of limited utility and should be reserved only for the
harshest of channel conditions” [Val02].
2.9 Summary
This chapter reviewed several topics necessary for a fundamental understanding
of Bluetooth. First, an overview of wireless computing was covered. Next, the Bluetooth
protocol was described. Additionally, Bluetooth security issues and performance were
discussed. The next chapter defines the experimental methodology of this investigation.
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Figure 3. PER versus BER for ACL packets. [JuP02]
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3. Methodology

3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the problem definition, specific research objectives, and a
solution methodology. The problem definition explains the problem under study.
Secondly, the objectives are discussed. Finally, the solution methodology is presented in
detail to include system boundaries, parameters, factors, evaluation technique and
experimental design and validation.
3.2 Problem Definition
The Air Force continually encourages the use of new technologies. New
technology can reduce cost, manpower, and increase productivity. However, new
technology often means new security risks. One of these new technologies is the
Bluetooth wireless networking protocol. As with many new technologies, most security
aspects have been examined, but maybe not every aspect. One aspect that has not been
explored is how much information can be determined by the type of packet used for
transmission. Another interesting aspect to explore is if the distance between users can
be identified by the type of packet being transmitted between two devices.
3.3.1 Research Objectives
The research objectives of this study consist of four parts:
1. To determine if Bluetooth devices from different manufacturers of transmit
data in identical ways.
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2. If there is a difference in the way manufacturers format a Bluetooth packet,
are there any security implications that can be determined?
3. Determine if a correlation exists between RSSI values, distance, antenna
orientation, and manufacturer.
4. Determine the distance between users by examining packet type.

It is expected that there will be a difference in the way that different
manufacturers transmit the same data over a Bluetooth link. The difference is expected
because of vendor specific implementations of the Bluetooth protocol. One vendor may
have a more efficient way of transmitting the data on the packet level compared to
another vendor. Different hardware chipsets used by manufacturers may have some
impact on the data transmissions. Further, manufacturers use different antenna
configurations that may work better than others.
To achieve the research goal the main investigative tool used will be Merlin,
manufactured by Computer Access Technology Corporation. Merlin is a packet capture
device for recording and analyzing packets in a Bluetooth piconet. Merlin is connected
to a computer via a USB connector and has a software interface. Merlin is a passive
device in a piconet, it does not transmit any Bluetooth packets, it only receives and
records packets.
One research objective is to determine how various manufacturers of Bluetooth
devices format a Bluetooth packet for transmission of identical data. If specific fields
within a Bluetooth packet can be changed by a manufacturer, are there any security
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weaknesses that can possibly be exploited? Does one manufacturer make a more secure
Bluetooth card than another manufacturer? All manufacturers must pass certain test
criteria to sell a network card that carries the Bluetooth name. However, each
manufacturer is free to design and manufacture network cards. As long as the network
card meets the Bluetooth specification, and passes the Bluetooth test, the card can be sold
as a Bluetooth networking card.
It is expected that most of the fields in the packet will remain unchanged from
vendor to vendor. Some fields will change, because the device clock and the Bluetooth
address will be different for each card.
Another question being examined in this research is if the distance between users
can be determined by the type of packet being transmitted. To accomplish the goal of
determining distance, research on what factors determine the difference between DH and
DM packets.
The Bluetooth specification does not specify the conditions when DM or DH
packets are used. The specification only says “quality measurements in the receiver of
one device can be used to dynamically control the packet type transmitted from the
remote device for optimization of the data throughput” [Blu01]. There is no reference as
to the input factors for “quality measurements”. Prior research [BaP99] has suggested
that the bit error rate of the RF channel is the primary factor for packet type. However,
the factors that influence the RF channel quality are not known. The RF quality between
different manufacturers may be attributed to antenna designs or other hardware that offer
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better reception of the RF signal. The channel bit error rate information is not available
to the user.
3.3.2 System Boundaries
The System Under Test consists of all components required for Bluetooth
communication. Two system components are used. One is used for file transfer. It is
composed of two Dell Inspiron 8200 laptops with Bluetooth NIC’s and Windows 2000.
The second system is one Dell Inspiron 8200 running Red Hat 8.0 Linux and one Dell
Inspiron 8200 running Windows 2000 operating system. These computers are used for
the RSSI portion of the testing. No files are transferred between the two laptops, only the
signal strength between the two Bluetooth NIC’s is measured. For each vendor’s
Bluetooth card, the corresponding software package is also installed on the laptops. The
software is needed to be able to transfer files between the two laptops. All the Bluetooth
cards used in this research meet the Bluetooth specifications Version 1.1.
The Component Under Test is the Bluetooth NIC that connects to the laptop.
These Bluetooth cards are tested in pairs, both cards being from the same manufacturer
and model. Testing the cards in identical pairs is done to eliminate errors caused by
different manufacturers.

3.3.3 Testing
Testing consists of verification, file size, file type, and repeatability. Verification
is needed to be sure that the entire file was transferred and not only part of it. A text file
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is used for this reason because it is easy to see in the packet payload where the text begins
and ends in order to verify complete file transmission. The file size for testing is a 1000
KB file. The 1000 KB file creates enough packets so that there are a large number of
packets to analyze. The file is also convenient to use because it is already on hand. Also,
using the same file every time ensures that the transmission payload is the same every
time.
The Bluetooth protocol supports other high-level networking protocols such as
TCP/IP and FTP. To test all the high-level protocols is impractical and beyond the scope
of this research. This experiment is limited to File Transport Protocol (FTP) traffic using
whatever packet type the vendor card chooses to transmit. FTP was chosen because it is
a common method of transferring files between computers. FTP is a method of file
transfer that Windows 2000 uses to transfer files. The DM5 (Data Medium rate 5) and
DH5 packet types are expected to be the most common packet types because they have
the largest payloads for transmitting data. Higher throughput is achieved by using the
longest time slot with the largest payload.

3.3.4 Physical Setup
The physical setup of the experiment is designed to minimize interference. The
experiment is performed indoors in a large 500 seat auditorium. The experiment is set up
on a stage 12 meters wide and 7 meters deep is surrounded on three sides by walls. The
stage floor is a carpet. The ceiling is approximately 10 meters tall.
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The laptops are set on wooden stools that are 97.248 centimeters high. Wooden
stools were used to minimize interference with the RF signal. All distances are measured
from the back of one laptop to the back of the second laptop. Merlin sits on a cart.
Merlin is physically located within 0.75 meters of the master laptop of the piconet. This
distance was chosen because the USB cord connecting Merlin to the laptop is only 0.75
meters long. Merlin is located 1 meter off the floor sitting on a cart. The recordings from
Merlin are the same whether it is connected to the master or the slave of the piconet, but
for consistency, Merlin is always connected to the master. The choice of master or slave
is made via software in the initial setup wizard in Merlin.
The network cards used in this experiment are all Bluetooth USB cards. The USB
cards are connected directly to the laptops. The USB cards are mounted in the top USB
port, and the USB cable for Merlin is located in the bottom port. The USB ports are
located on the back left of the Dell Inspiron 8200 laptop, and on the back right of the Dell
Latitude D600 laptop.
The Bluetooth specification defines three power levels for Bluetooth cards. The
different power levels have different transmission ranges. Table 2 below describes the
power levels and transmission ranges for differing power class. All the Bluetooth cards
used in this experiment are Power Class 3 cards designed for maximum transmission
range of 10 meters.
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Table 2 Power Classes [Blu01]

One of the parameters for this research is the pair-wise antenna orientation. One
antenna (located in the laptop) is rotated in 90 degree increments, and the other antenna
(located in the other laptop) remains stationary. For this research, the master of the
piconet is the antenna that is rotated. The slave is the laptop that is moved further away
from the master as the distance increased. The master laptop is never moved, it is only
rotated.
For this research, four antenna orientations are used and described as; 360
degrees, 90 degrees, 180 degrees and 270 degrees. When both antennas are pointing in
the same direction, this is defined as the 360 degree orientation. When the transmitter is
pointing at the receiver, is the 90 degree orientation. The 180 degree orientation is when
the two antennas are pointing in opposite directions, and the 270 degree orientation is
when the transmitter is pointing away from the receiver. Figure 4 below gives a
graphical description of the antenna orientation setup.
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Figure 4 Antenna Orientations [Tay04]

3.3.5 Performance Metrics
Possible relationships between RSSI value, distance, antenna orientation and
Bluetooth device manufacturer are investigated to predict the packet type transmitted.
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One of the research goals is to determine the signal strength threshold value as indicated
by the RSSI value that causes a packet switch from the DH type packet to the DM type
packet.
The performance metrics used in this research are the distance and RSSI signal
strength values which cause a switch between DH and DM type packets. Both distance
and signal strength are expected to be different for each card manufacturer because of
different antenna designs and the type of chipsets used in the hardware.
The RSSI value is determined by three factors: distance, antenna orientation, and
the network card manufacturer. The packet type has no impact on the RSSI value. The
factors that influence packet type are the signal strength, distance, antenna orientation and
the manufacturer of the network card and the corresponding software.
The performance metric used to evaluate the packet type experiment is the
percentage of DH packets compared to the total number of data packets. The null and
hop packets are a significant amount of packets transmitted, and are of no use in this
research. The null and hop packets are not used for any evaluation metric, and are
ignored. A sharp drop in the percentage of DH packets at a given distance would be a
useful pattern to recognize. Observing the distance at which a change in packet type
occurs could allow an observer to make an educated guess at the distance between
Bluetooth devices.
3.3.6 Parameters
The parameters for this experiment are as follows:
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•

Packet Type – The signal quality and corresponding bit error rates are
determining factors in the type of packets transmitted. The user has no
control over which type of packet are used for transmission.

•

Method of file transfer – Each manufacturer supplies software with the
card. However, an alternate method for transferring files is to use the
Windows Explorer and drag and drop the file from one laptop to the other.
Both versions use FTP as the underlying protocol, but the user interface is
different.

•

The manufacturer’s software – Each manufacturer supplies their own
software for use with their Bluetooth card. Using the appropriate software
is important to make sure the device is operating as intended by the
manufacturer.

•

Environmental conditions – Temperature and humidity can impact RF
signal quality. The effects of these two parameters are mitigated by
testing indoors in a climate controlled environment. All tests are done
under similar conditions.

3.3.7 Factors
The factors for this experiment are:
•

The manufacturer of the Bluetooth network card. This experiment uses
the following Bluetooth Card: Epox BT-DG02 USB, D-Link DBT-120
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USB, Hawking Technology H-BT10U USB, Belkin F8T003 USB.
These cards are a representative sample of industry standards.
•

Distance between laptops – The distance between Bluetooth devices can
have an impact on performance. Beyond the protocol’s 10 meter limit,
numerous packet errors can occur. The experimental starting distance is
0 meters apart, and increases in 1 meter increments out to 10 meters.

•

Antenna Orientation – This may have some impact on the error
transmission rates. It will have an impact on the transmission range, as
noted by Kneeland [Kne03]. Antenna orientation is varied in 90 degree
increments on only one machine.

3.4.1 Evaluation Technique
For this research, direct measurement is used. This approach was chosen because
it would be impractical to create a simulation for the system under test. It is much easier
and very practical to run the experiment in a live environment. While testing in a real life
environment may introduce some errors, it is a very good representation of how the
system may be used outside of an academic study. Direct measurement is also the
simplest means to determine the correlation between network card manufacturer and
packet type.
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3.4.2 Experimental Design
The experimental design for this research has multiple steps. The first step is to
get the RSSI values at various distances for different pairs of manufacturer cards. The
second step is to transfer data between two laptops and record the packet transmissions.
Once the two steps are accomplished, the relationship between distance, signal strength,
manufacturer and packet type can be determined.
3.4.3 Settings on Merlin
All the testing is performed using the Merlin recording wizard. Screen shots of
the settings used with Merlin are provided in Appendix A. The only change made to the
default settings is to increase the buffer size to 128 MB from the default of 1 MB.
Increasing the buffer size is required to capture the entire file transfer data packets. The
extra buffer space that is not used is discarded at the end of the recording.
Merlin records all the packets transmitted from the time the piconet is first
established until the piconet is destroyed, or until the buffer on Merlin is full. The
packets that are of most interest are the packets used to transmit data, and the link
manager protocol packets. Many packets recorded in Merlin are the polling packets
between the master and slave. The polling packets are of little use in this experiment and
are ignored. Another large number of packets are for the hopping frequency, and are of
limited use in this research. Merlin has a setting that hides the null and poll packets, only
data packets and link manager protocol packets remain. Hiding the null and poll packets
is a useful feature to see where the data transmission begins and ends.
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3.4.4 Signal Strength
Some Bluetooth cards have the ability to read the Receiver Signal Strength
Indicator (RSSI) value. This is accessed through the Host Controller Interface (HCI)
software. All transceivers supporting variable power transmission links make use of the
RSSI value. The RSSI feature is an optional item that some Bluetooth manufacturers
choose to support. The Bluetooth specification gives a brief description of how the RSSI
value is calculated and used. “The RSSI measurement compares the received signal
power with two threshold levels, which define the Golden Receive Power Range. The
lower threshold level corresponds to a received power between -56 dB and 6 dB above
the actual receiver sensitivity. The upper threshold level is 20 dB above the lower
threshold to an accuracy of +/- 6 dB” [Blu01]. Figure 5 gives a graphical representation
of the above description.
3.5 Summary
The experiment outlined in this chapter is intended to determine if there are any
differences in the way Bluetooth cards from different manufacturers transmit data. Based
on differences established between manufacturers, Chapter 4 describes the approach
taken to determine which one is more efficient and if there are any security implications
between the vendors. Also being examined is if the distance between users can be
determined by the packet type that is being transmitted.
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Figure 5. RSSI Range and Accuracy [Blu01]
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4. Experiments, Data, and Analysis
4.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses orientation and packet type experiments using commercial
off-the-shelf Bluetooth USB cards. First, a test is performed to see if data is transmitted
differently by manufacturers. Second, the antenna orientation experiment is discussed
along with the data collected and data analysis. Third, the distance and packet type
experiment is discussed along with the data collected and the data analysis.
Analysis for each card pair is performed separately. Each card is examined
separately because the data collected for each card is very different. To aid in the
analysis of research results, JMP version 5.0.1.2 is used. JMP is a statistical analysis
program produced by SAS institute Inc.
4.2 Supported Features
Of the four cards tested, the DLink, Hawking, and Belkin cards all support the full
range of features. The Epox cards tested support all features of the other three with the
exception of power control, i.e., the Epox card transmits at one fixed power output level.
The transmit power on a card is adjusted based on the RSSI value of the device. “If the
RSSI value differs too much from the preferred value of a Bluetooth device, it can
request an increase or a decrease of the other device’s TX power” [Blu02].
4.2 Manufacturer Differences
The first test performed is to determine if there are any differences in the way
various manufacturers transmit the same data. The approach is to record all the packets
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used for transmitting the test file, and then examine the packets to see if there are any
unique characteristics that can be noted. Upon examination of various aspects of the
recording, it was determined that there are no significant differences in the way the four
different manufacturers transmit the test file.
The areas that are examined are how the initial link pair between the two devices
is set up, the Link Manager Protocol messages used, and the payloads of the data packets.
All the manufacturers take the same steps to set up the link, the LMP message are
virtually identical, and very little data is sent before the actual file. The only difference is
the packet type used for transmission of the test file. However, packet type is dependent
upon the link quality and other factors, not determined by manufacturer of the card. The
uniformity of the initial transmission does not contain any unique identifiers to be able to
identify a specific manufacturer. The only time there could be a fingerprint of a
manufacturer is during the initial set up. Once the file transfer begins, the only data being
transmitted it the test file and occasionally some information in the Link Manager
Protocol packets.
4.3 Antenna Orientation
For the antenna orientation experiment, the objective is to collect data on the
distance and antenna orientation and the corresponding RSSI values. The RSSI value
metric would then be combined to see if there is a relationship between distance and
RSSI and what impact, if any, may result from antenna orientation. Also being examined
is if there is a specific RSSI threshold value that determines packet type. A 90%
confidence interval is used for the antenna orientation and RSSI value tests. A 90%
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confidence was chosen because of the inherent inaccuracy of the RSSI measurement (+/6 dB).
The RSSI values for the Epox card are the highest of the four cards at 18 dB, but
falling to zero dB at distances just over one meter. Table 3 below shows the RSSI values
with respect to distance for the Epox card.

Table 3. RSSI Values for Epox (dB)

Distance (meters)

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Orientation (degrees)
90
180
270
360
18
18
10.17 15.18
4.04
11
6.95
0.07
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

The ANOVA analysis from JMP showed that the only significant factor was
distance. The Table 5 shows the ANOVA results. The majority of the variation (87.3%)
is due to distance. This is expected because of path loss. The antenna orientation was
not a factor, and did not have any impact in the ANOVA. The combination of distance
and orientation accounted for 12.6% of the variance.
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Table 4. ANOVA for Epox RSSI Values
Variability Chart for Average RSSI Value
Analysis of Variance
Source
Distance
Antenna
Distance*Antenna
Within
Total

DF
10
3
30
88
131

SS
2713.493
30.84858
283.7727
0
3028.114

Mean Square
271.349
10.2829
9.45909
0
23.1154

F Ratio
28.6866
1.0871
.

Prob > F
<.0001
0.3696
.

Variance Components
Component
Distance
Antenna
Distance*Antenna
Within
Total

Var Component
21.824185
0.024963
3.153030
0.000000
25.002178

% of Total Plot%
87.3
0.1
12.6
0.0
100.0

Sqrt(Var Comp)
4.6716
0.1580
1.7757
0.0000
5.0002

The RSSI values for the Hawking card are much different. Table 6 below shows
the RSSI values for the Hawking card. Most of the values of RSSI values were negative,
but did not seem to drop very dramatically as distance increased.

Table 5. Hawking Technologies RSSI Values (dB)

Distance (meters)

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Orientation (degrees)
90
180
270
360
0
0.81
-2.66
0
0
0
0
0
-1.67 -0.35
0
-0.34
-3.38 -2.36 -2.21
-3.9
-2
-0.19
0
-5.43
-4.1
-1.88 -2.26 -6.34
-4.15 -3.02
-3.2
-1.61
-3.58 -7.92 -6.03 -3.55
-8.61
-5.1
-4.72 -7.16
-9.05 -4.95 -2.58 -3.15
-5.62 -3.19 -4.59 -7.23
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The ANOVA analysis from JMP is shown in Table 7 below. The only significant
factor is distance, and it makes up 56.4% of the variation. Antenna orientation was not a
significant factor, and only had minimal impact in the variation at 2.2%. The interaction
of the distance and orientation is not a significant factor. However, they did make up
41.4% of the variability.

Table 6. ANOVA for Hawking Technologies RSSI Values
Variability Chart for Average RSSI Value

Analysis of Variance
Source
Distance
Antenna
Distance*Antenna
Within
Total

DF
10
3
30
88
131

SS
573.4915
42.4504
266.7088
0
882.6507

Mean Square
57.3491
14.1501
8.89029
0
6.73779

F Ratio
6.45076
1.59164
.

Prob > F
<.0001
0.2120
.

Variance Components
Component
Distance
Antenna
Distance*Antenna
Within
Total

Var Component
4.0382377
0.1593891
2.9634314
0.0000000
7.1610582

% of Total Plot%
56.4
2.2
41.4
0.0
100.0

Sqrt(Var Comp)
2.0095
0.3992
1.7215
0.0000
2.6760

The data for the Belkin card looks very similar to that of the Hawking card. The
card starts off right at zero dB for close distances and gradually drops to – 8 dB as
distance increases. The table below shows the data collected for the RSSI experiment.
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Table 7. Belkin RSSI Values (dB)
Orientation (degrees)
90
180
270
360

Distance (meters)

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

0
0
0
-3.32
-8.87
-9.12
-9.93
-9
-6.06
-5.89
-5.89

0.07
0
0
0
-1.45
-4.68
-9.44
-8.78
-6.38
-7.22
-7.22

-0.41
0
0
-1.61
0
-4.16
-8.02
-7.86
-4.63
-5.23
-5.23

-0.05
0
-6
-6.71
-4.02
-6.93
-9
-8.98
-8.6
-8
-8

The ANOVA analysis from JMP shows that the significant factors were distance
and antenna orientation. The results are shown in Table 9 below. The significant factors
for the Belkin card are both distance and antenna orientation. Distance is 70.5% of the
total variance, and antenna orientation is 8.1%. Antenna orientation is much higher
compared to the other three cards tested. The interaction of distance and orientation
accounts for 21.3% of the variance. This is rather high percentage of variance for a
second level interaction. This is most likely due to the inherent inaccuracy of the RSSI
value measurement.
The DLink card appeared to fare the worst in the RSSI testing. Table 10 below
shows the data collected for the DLink card. It appears as if the lowest RSSI value the
hardware supports is -10 dB. This lower threshold is reached in only three meters. The
RSSI values drop very rapidly with distance.
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Table 8. ANOVA for Belkin RSSI Values
Variability Chart for Average RSSI Value
Analysis of Variance
Source
Distance
Antenna
Distance*Antenna
Within
Total

DF
10
3
30
88
131

SS
1239.802
135.6887
261.6731
0
1637.164

Mean Square
123.98
45.2296
8.72244
0
12.4974

F Ratio
14.2139
5.1854
.

Prob > F
<.0001
0.0053
.

Variance Components
Component
Distance
Antenna
Distance*Antenna
Within
Total

Var Component
9.604815
1.106276
2.907479
0.000000
13.618570

% of Total Plot%
70.5
8.1
21.3
0.0
100.0

Sqrt(Var Comp)
3.0992
1.0518
1.7051
0.0000
3.6903

Table 3. DLink RSSI Values (dB)

Distance (Meters)

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Orientation (degrees)
90
180
270
360
0
2.6
-0.2
0
-9
-5.85 -0.046
-6
-7.21 -5.28 -3.97 -7.35
-10
-9.81 -8.42
-9.2
-7.64 -3.43 -6.84
-9
-10
-9.74
-10
-10
-8.53 -9.35
-10
-10
-10
-10
-10
-9.73
-10
-3.57 -8.67
-10
-4.64
-10
-10
-9.72
-10
-9.52
-9.2
-10

The ANOVA analysis is shown in the Table 11 below. The significant factors are
only distance. The distance accounts for 70.5% of the variance. Antenna orientation
accounts for only 1.6% of the variance. The combination of the two accounts for 27.9%
of the variance.
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Table 4. ANOVA for DLink RSSI Values
Variability Chart for Average RSSI Value
Analysis of Variance
Source
Distance
Antenna
Distance*Antenna
Within
Total

DF
10
3
30
88
131

SS
1190.527
52.42627
321.6321
0
1564.586

Mean Square
119.053
17.4754
10.7211
0
11.9434

F Ratio
11.1046
1.6300
.

Prob > F
<.0001
0.2032
.

Variance Components
Component
Distance
Antenna
Distance*Antenna
Within
Total

Var Component
9.027639
0.204677
3.573690
0.000000
12.806006

% of Total Plot%
70.5
1.6
27.9
0.0
100.0

Sqrt(Var Comp)
3.0046
0.4524
1.8904
0.0000
3.5785

4.4 Distance and Packet Type
As previously mentioned, most of the packets observed in transmission are for the
hop frequency and the null packet. As transmissions times increase, so does the number
of hop packets. The increased number of hop packets is because the hop frequency
changes every 625 microseconds. A typical number of packets needed to transmit the
test file are around 28,000 total packets. However, this can vary considerably. The
DLink card, at longer distances, requires over 800,000 packets to transmit the test file.
This is an exception case.
The second goal of this research is to determine at what distance a manufacturer
switches from using a DH packet to a DM packet. Each card is evaluated separately.
The performance metric used to make this determination is the percentage of DH type
packets compared to the total number of data packets (comprised of both the DM and DH
packet type). In cases where the DH type packet is used, there are usually an equal
number of DM1 packets compared to DH packets. The large numbers of DM1 packets
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are observed because Bluetooth uses the DM1 packet for L2CAP message. DM1 packets
are also used where only a small amount of data needs to transmitted.
For all the cards tested, a complete ANOVA is performed using JMP for each
packet type. Each card is analyzed separately because it allows for examination of the
significant factors of each manufacturer. The complete ANOVA tables are located in
Appendix E-H, but only the important highlights are discussed within the thesis. A
confidence interval of 95% is used to determine significant factors.

4.4.1 D-Link DBT-120 USB
The DLink card has the most clear-cut definition between the DH and DM
packets. At the zero and one meter distance, the DH packet type comprises between
0.5% and 55% of the total data packets. All the distances past two meters exclusively use
the DM packet. Past two meters, the DH packet type was almost never used. Table 11
shows the percentage of DH type packets with respect to distance.
The DM1 packet is used more as the distance increases. From three meters to ten
meters, the DM1 packet accounts for nearly 100% of the data packets. The DM5 packet
was not used after five meters. It is known that the DM1 packet is used most often when
the signal quality is very poor. Also, the extremely large number of packets transmitted
with errors provides evidence of poor signal quality. Given the Merlin test configuration,
there is no way to record the channel bit error rate to determine what constitutes a poor
quality signal.
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It is important to note that the DLink card was physically the smallest of the four
cards tested and seemed to have problems transmitting at distances past five meters.
Common problems encountered are failure to send the file, failure to locate the other
laptop, errors in the packets that were transmitted, and very low throughput.
The variability charts for all the cards shows the percentage of DH type packets used in
transmission. What is expected is the DH type used at short ranges, then not be used at
all at longer ranges. When no DH packets are used, then the DM packet type is used.
Ideally there is a distinct break at certain distances where the packet type switch occurs.
In Figure 6, the DH packet is used for the zero and one meter distance.

Mean(DH % of Data Packets)
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Figure 4 DH packet type at distance for DLink
The ANOVA from JMP shows the significant factors to be distance and distance
with orientation. Of these factors, distance accounts for 49.8 % of the variance, and
48

distance and antenna orientation account for 32.9%. The repetitions of each file transfer
combined with distance and orientation account for only 13.2%. This lower percentage
can be attributed to the transmissions having very similar characteristics between each
repetition.

4.4.2 Epox USB BT-DG02 USB
The Epox card was the hardest to analyze. There is no significant change in
packet type as distance increases. Also, the RSSI values are the same from two to ten
meters, at a value of zero dB. The lack of change over distance or RSSI value makes it
impossible to predict the packet type with respect to distance.
The percentage of DH packets ranges from 52% down to almost 0%. This is a
very wide range to try and analyze. At a distance of one meter, 51.6% of the data packets
are the DH type for all antenna orientations. At a distance of ten meters, and the 90
degree antenna orientation, 52.6% of the packets are the DH type. At ten meters and 180
degrees orientation, between 1% and 18% of the packets are DH type. It would appear
that at longer ranges, antenna orientation does have an impact on the packet type.
A significant number of DH type packets are present at all ranges that were tested.
There is no distance where an abrupt change in packet type occurs. The DH packet type
is used in significant number at all distances. So, for the Epox card tested, there is no
way to determine a specific distance that a certain packet type will be used. Figure 6
illustrates the variability in the use of the DH type packet over the transmission ranges.
Even at the maximum distance of ten meters, the DH type packet is used in 25% of the
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transmission, roughly the same amount that occurs at four meters. Similar frequency of
DH packets at different distances for the Epox card means that there is no distinct
distance where a packet type change occurs.
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Figure 5 DH packet type at distance for Epox

The ANOVA from JMP shows two significant factors for the Epox card, distance
and distance with orientation. The components of the variance are distance with
orientation (38.3%), distance (33.9%), and repetitions of distance and orientation
(27.9%).
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4.4.3 Hawking Technology H-BT10U USB
The third card analyzed is the Hawking card. This is also a difficult card to
analyze with no apparent pattern. There is no clearly observable change in packet type
with an increase in distance. From zero to two meters, the DH5 packet type is the most
used packet type. The DH type packets account for 51% of the total data packets.
However, from three meters to eight meters, the DH packet type is still used, but it is not
very common. Its percentages drop to between 1% and 10%. However, there are several
exceptional cases where it varies between 35% to 45%. The packet type varies widely
between repetitions at these distances. In some repetitions, the DH packet type is used,
and in other repetitions of the same distance and antenna orientation, the DH packet type
is not used. Figure 7 shows the wide variations in the percentages of DH type packets.
Initially the use of DH type packets drops off with distance out to seven meters. The DH
packet type then is used more frequently at the eight meter to ten meter distance. This is
completely unexpected to see the DH packets used at longer ranges.
The ANOVA from JMP of the Hawking card shows the same significant factors
as the other cards, distance and distance with antenna orientation. The variance due to
distance is 43.3%, the repetitions of distance with orientation is 39.1%, and distance with
orientation is17.6%
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Figure 6 DH packet type at distance for Hawking

4.4.4 Belkin F8T003 USB
The fourth card analyzed is the Belkin card. This card also has a distinct pattern
of packet type and distance. As expected, at short distances the DH5 packet type is the
most common. At one meter or less, the DH packet type is 78% of the data packets.
There are also a very low number of DM1 packets. Distance increases cause a change in
packet type. The packet type change occurs at the three meter mark. Beyond the three
meter distance, the percentage of DH packets drops to 0-5% of the data packets. The
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small rise at 10 meters is not enough to be statistically significant. Figure 8 below shows
the percentages of DH packets at all distances.
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Figure 7 DH packet type at distance for Belkin

The ANOVA for the Belkin card is similar to the other three cards tested. The
significant factors are distance, and distance with orientation. The variation of each
component was slightly different than the rest. Distance, at 63.1%, accounts for the vast
majority of the variation. The rest of the variation is distance with orientation at 22.3%,
repetitions of distance with orientation at 8.8% and finally antenna orientation alone at
5.8%.
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4.5 Common Observations
During the conduct of this research, several observations were noted. These are
observations that seem to hold true, but there are no statistics or metrics to back up the
claims. The first observation was related to the power levels used in transmission. Of the
three cards that did support variable power transmission, all the cards used maximum
power, even at the closest distance. The cards did not start out transmitting at maximum
power, but within a few thousand packets, LMP messages were sent to increase power.
There are no errors in the packets being transmitted to indicate the link is poor quality.
The fact that all the cards eventually transmitted at max power, even at close distances,
suggests that power control is not a very important feature for a Bluetooth card to
support. The one card that did not support variable levels of power transmission, Epox,
did not have any trouble transmitting the test file to a maximum distance of ten meters.
Not supporting variable power transmission is not detrimental to the card.
The second common aspect observed in the testing was when LMP messages
were sent to change between the non-FEC packet type, DH, and the FEC packet type,
DM. There is no pattern for the number of packets having correctable or uncorrectable
errors before a switch of packet type. In looking at the data recordings, there is no real
pattern of when a packet type was changed. However, both the master and the slave
make the change at the same time.
The third observation was the number and type of packets transmitted. The three
most frequently observed packet types are the DM1, DM5 and DH5. The DM3 is seen
less often then the main three. The ratio of DM3 packets varies slightly by manufacturer,
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but they typically account for between 5%-8% of the total number of data packets. The
Belkin card at distances past four meters has the highest level of DM3 packets at 35%55% of the total data packets. The last two packet types, DH1 and DH3, are only very
rarely observed. Out of a typical 30,000 packet transmissions, it is common to see fewer
than ten packets of DH1 or DH3 type. These packets are only very rarely used. The
reason for the infrequent use of the DH1 and DH3 might be related to the research by
Valenti [Val02]. The Valenti research shows that the DH1 and DH3 packet type never
achieve maximum throughput for any signal to noise ratio.
Another attributes that all the cards share is the manufacture of both the hardware
and the software. All the hardware chipsets are produced by Cambridge Silicon Radio
(CSR). Each Bluetooth card uses a slightly different hardware version, they are all made
by CSR. No information can be found on the differences between the CSR chipsets. The
software is also produced by a common manufacturer, Widcomm. Like the hardware,
three cards use a slightly different version of the software, but it is all produced by the
same company. The Belkin card is the only one to use a different software package. It
looks like this software is developed specifically for the Belkin cards.
The primary limitation for this research is the highly variable nature of the RF
signal used for transmission. The RF signal can be influenced by temperature, humidity,
the physical layout of the room, microwaves and other electronic interference. A room
with cubicle walls and lots of people can reduce the signal strength of the Bluetooth
signal. However, actually measuring the quality of the Bluetooth signal and the
associated degrading factors would be very useful, but beyond the scope of this research.
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Figure 8 Specific Properties

4.6 Summary
This chapter discussed the antenna orientation and packet type experiments
performed, the data collected and the data analysis. The antenna orientation experiments
showed that certain orientation of the Bluetooth device antenna received stronger signals
that others and that orientation of the antenna is a statistically significant factor in three of
the four cards. However, antenna orientation or signal strength had no impact on the
packet type used for transmission. The manufacture tests showed that there is not enough
information to identify a manufacturer based solely on observing the packets being
transmitted. There are no unique signatures that can be observed by looking at the
packets transmitted.
The goal of using packet type to determine the distance between transmitter and
receiver is only partially successful. Distance between transmitter and receiver can be
determined for the DLink and Belkin cards. The distance between transmitter and
receiver for the Epox and Hawking can not be determined. The RSSI value has no
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predictive value of what kind of packet used in transmission. There is not enough
evidence to support a conclusion for a general Bluetooth case. Each manufacturer has a
different RSSI value, and different mix of DM and DH packets.
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5. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews and summarizes research accomplishments and objectives.
First, the impact of the research is discussed and the implications for Bluetooth devices
within the DoD. Second, the experimental objectives and results are reviewed along with
conclusions drawn. Last, the areas for further study are proposed.
5.2 Research Impact
Overall, the RSSI values provide no benefit in predicting packet type for
equipment tested from all manufacturers tested. Previous research performed by Captain
Tim Kneeland [Kne02] has shown the very limited use of RSSI values in predicting
throughput. The RSSI value reported by a card is only accurate within +/-6 dB according
to the Bluetooth specification. [Blu02]
The ability to covertly monitor Bluetooth packets and determine a user’s location
would be useful. If this can be done, it would be one more security risk that may need
addressing within the DoD prior to large scale use. Determining the distance between
users could be the first step to linking a Bluetooth identity to a real identity. While this
might not be a big issue on an installation, it might be something to consider when using
Bluetooth in public areas, like an airport or a restaurant.
5.3 Outlines of Future Work
This research provides a preliminary look at trying to determine the distance
between users based solely on packet type. Based on the limited success of the work
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done so far, it does not seem to warrant further exploration. There is not enough
information available to an outside observer looking solely at packet information to make
reliable distance estimates. The issue of distance with direction, needed to determine a
user’s actual location, has not been explored. The most practical way to determine a
user’s location would be the use of specialized hardware. I would not recommend any
more research down this path.
There has been some indication the Bluetooth SIG is adding a user location
feature in the next release of the Bluetooth specification for pervasive computing
purposes. However, the Bluetooth specification version 2.0 released in November 2003
has no support.
For this research to have more impact, the ability to record or determine the bit
error rate of the Bluetooth link would be very useful. If the bit error rate of the signal can
be determined, the crossover points for different packet types may be determined and
better distance estimates determined.
Another possible topic to explore is to try to determine the higher level protocol
used above Bluetooth. For example, does FTP traffic generate different packet pattern
than HTTP traffic? Can one determine what type of application is running on the
Bluetooth device solely by looking at the type of packets being transmitted? Some
related work is already being done using the 802.11 wireless networking protocols with
some success. Bluetooth might be another wireless protocol to examine.
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5.4 Summary
This research determined if it is possible to estimate the distance between users
based on packet type and signal strength. The antenna orientation experiments
determined the significance of antenna orientation on RSSI values. The packet type
experiment generated an estimate of expected packet type for a specific distances and
manufacturers.

Together, these provide a first look study investigating the possibility of

using Bluetooth technology to locate Bluetooth users.
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Appendix A
Merlin Bluetooth Packet Analyzer Settings

Figure 9. Merlin General Recording Options
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Appendix B
Receiver Signal Strength Indicator Sampler Script for Linux
# RSSI Sampler by Tim Kneeland
# Last updated Dec 2, 2002
# This script samples Receiver Signal Strength Indicator values and outputs
# them to a file. A connection must be established first with a transmitter
# using "hcitool cc <BD_ADDR>". Script execution requires three command line
# arguments following script name. First argument is the BD_ADDR of the
# transmitter a connection is established with. Second argument is the name
# of the output file to append the data too. Third argument is the number of
# RSSI samples to take for each orientation and distance measurement. Script
# will promt for distance in meters (integer values only) and promt to change
# orientation of receiver. Script is exited inputing a distance of 99.
# Output the date to file
date >> $2
# A distance of 99 will exit the script
distance=0
while [ $distance -le 99 ]
do
# Prompt for distance
echo -n "Input distance between transmitter and receiver in meters: "
read distance
if [ $distance -eq 99 ]
then
exit 1
fi
# Output distance to file
echo "Distance in meters: $distance" >> $2
# Four different orientations
for iteration in 1 2 3 4
do
# Prompt for proper orientation of receiver
echo -n "Place receiver at `expr 90 \* $iteration` degrees and hit enter."
read z
echo "Orientation in degrees: `expr 90 \* $iteration`" >> $2
# Sample RSSI the number of times specified by the third argument
x=1
while [ $x -le $3 ]
do
hcitool rssi $1 >> $2
x=`expr $x + 1`
done
done
done
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Appendix C
Bluetooth Manufacture Hardware Versions
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Figure 13. Belkin F8T003 USB Hardware
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Figure 14. D-Link DBT-120 USB Hardware
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Figure 15. Epox BT-DG02 USB Hardware
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Figure 16. Hawking Technology H-BT10U USB Hardware
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Appendix D
Bluetooth Manufacture Software Versions
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Figure 17. Belkin F87003 USB Software
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Figure 18. D-Link DBT-120 USB Software page 1
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Figure 19. D-Link DBT-120 USB Software page 2
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Figure 20. Epox BT-DG02 USB Software page 1
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Figure 21. Epox BT-DG-2 USB Software page 2
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Figure 22. Hawking Technology H-BT10U USB Software page 1
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Figure 23. Hawking Technology H-BT10U USB Software page 2
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Appendix E
Features Supported for Bluetooth Cards

Figure 24. Features Supported on DLink, Hawking and Belkin cards
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Figure 25 Features Supported on Epox Card (No power control)
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Appendix F
ANOVA for Belkin F8T003 USB
Variability Chart for DH % of Data Packets
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Appendix G
ANOVA Charts for Hawking Technology H-10BTU USB
Variability Chart for DH % of Data Packets
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Appendix H
ANOVA Charts for Epox BT-DG02 USB
Variability Chart for DH % of Data Packets
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Appendix I
ANOVA Charts for D-Link DBT-120 USB
Variability Chart for DH % of Data Packets
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